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The surveys of facilities which covered a representative cross section of the 
American workplace provided a necessary technical bridge-of-data between the 
analytical models and the actual working operations. The United States gen- 
erates a volume of economic data through agencies such as the Bureau of the 
Census and organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce. Economic modeling 
must utilize such data in evaluating the potential effects of fiber induced 
failures. The working operations within the United States generally recognize 
the potential for a failure within items of electrical equipment and usually 
take some precaution even if it only amounts to keeping some spare light 
bulbs. Since airborne graphite fibers have the potential to cause electrical 
failures, the surveys had to provide the three interrelated elements of data 
as outlined in Figure 1. The response to a failure in an item of electrical 
equipment implies an economic impact. The failure site must be located, the 
failure cleared, and the item repaired. During that period of time operators 
may be idled, product can be damaged, delayed or both. Such considerations 
become the basis for assigning a cost to a potential fiber induced failure. 
The survey effort made an early recognition that failures in some items of 
equipment could impact lives and these areas received the necessary priority. 
The third element of data addressed the nature of the operation performed. 
Airborne fibers represent an increment in the total environment at the work- 
place and many operations must contend with harsh or unusual environmental 
conditions. The need for an environmental control as dictated by the work- 
place could bar the entry of fibers, or conceivably even make the operation 
more sensitive to fibers. 
Surveys of facilities had to cover a representative cross section of the work- 
places in the United States; the survey teams made a total of 62 visits to the 
locations summarized in Figure 2. The approach to the conduct of the surveys 
first recognized those areas considered most sensitive to influence by air- 
borne graphite fibers and then utilized the result from the first series to 
focus the direction and detail for the next. The first series of surveys con- 
centrated on hospitals, air traffic controls, telephone exchanges, public 
communications and the manufacture of electronic equipment. The surveys then 
broadened to cover the range-of-use for equipment considered sensitive to 
failures from airborne graphite fibers. 
The surveys of manufacturing operations utilized the data from the Bureau of 
the Census "Standard Industrial Classifications" (SIC) as employed in the 
"Census of Manufacturers." In these col?pilations, the census divides manu- 
facturing into 20 general classifications each assigned a two digit code. 
The code extends to four digits to reach specific product areas. As an ex- 
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ample, acrylic fiber manufacture falls under the product designation of "Organ- 
ic Fibers, Noncellulosic" SIC 2824. All "Plastic Materials Synthetics" are 
combined as SIC 282 and are part of the total "Chemicals and Allied Products" 
SIC 28. The census data summarizes total yearly values-of-shipments for each 
two digit SIC code and then provides a total for the nation. The 20 manu- 
facturing operations surveyed provide a representative sampling of that 
portion of American industry whose functioning depends upon the use of elec- 
trical and electronic equipment. The sample surveyed includes typical in- 
dustrial operations which account for 85 percent of the total national value- 
of-shipments as compiled in the last Census of Manufacturers (1972). 
The conduct of these surveys acknowledges a cooperation and support from both 
governmental and private organizations. Municipalities and counties provided 
access to hospitals, airports, air traffic control towers and their police 
or fire communication centers. Cooperating federal agencies supported the 
surveys of air traffic control centers, Amtrak, the Post Office and a Federal 
Reserve Bank. The private sector supported the full range of survey work 
from hospitals and airlines through a representative range of manufacturing. 
The results from all of these surveys shaped the appropriate portions of the 
economic model for defining the impact cost associated with the risk analysis. 
Patterns for protective measures began to show early in the survey process. 
Figure 3 lists the types or elements of protection which appeared. Much of 
the office space and a significant portion of the industrial installations 
require air conditioning. Many of the newer buildings are not usable without 
air conditioning because their construction does not permit adequate venti- 
lation by natural means. In other cases the nature of the operation performed 
requires the cleanliness associated with a controlled and filtered ventilation 
system. Potentially sensitive items such as computers, data processors, sig- 
nal generators and electronic test racks often impose requirements on temper- 
ature controls or shielding which result in specialized isolated installations. 
For much of the manufacturing industries, the operating environment at the 
workplaces becomes hostile to electrical and electronic equipment. Such op- 
erating environments involve sprays from cutting fluids, corrosive fumes, 
even explosive atmospheres. The operation of electronic equipment under such 
conditions requires either tight cabinets or coated circuit boards. In some 
operations even the best electrical devices can wear, drift, or change in 
some way that requires attention. Such operations recognize these limitations 
and either keep a stock of spare parts or employ multiple installations. 
The survey program identified ten areas where an electrical failure could im- 
pose a major impact. Each of these areas had recognized environmental con- 
straints which would influence their interactions with airborne fibers. 
Figure 4 summarizes these areas in terms of the concern, the operating 
environment, the protective measures currently in place and the effect such 
measures would have on the ingestion of airborne graphite fibers. 
The compromise of life-supporting electrical equipment in hospital operating 
rooms or intensive care units became one of the first major concerns. A 
patient in an operating room or an ICU must have protection from airborne 
micro-organisms and a range of ingestible contaminants. In recognition, the 
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Hill-Burton act which provides federal funding to hospitals also imposes the 
requirement for high efficiency dust removal filtration in such ventilating 
systems. High efficiency dust removal filters and filters classified as 
High Efficiency Particle Arrest (HEPA) effectively bar the entrance of air- 
borne fibers; both types are now in hospital service. For patients in the 
regular hospital areas, the electronic equipment provides monitoring or sup- 
port for a specific function. Here, the quantity of bedding in a hospital 
imposes a lint laden environment. Cases or cabinets which protect against 
lint also protect against the entry of graphite fibers. 
Ground control of aircraft represents a second area where an electrical fail- 
ure could have a serious impact. The combination of transmitters, displays, 
and signal conditioning equipment impose thermal loads which result in dedi- 
cated air conditioning systems for towers and area air traffic control centers. 
Remotely mounted beacons and transmitters must be protected from the weather, 
and these items have particular needs for radio frequency (RF) shielding or 
isolation. The net result of the combination either prevents fibers from 
entering the area or prevents fibers from entering a cabinet. 
A third area involving a potential hazard to life could be the failure of a 
communication system in responding to emergency situations such as fires, 
accidents or even natural disasters. The communication links between a dis- 
patcher and remote vehicles require the use of redundant installations. 
Communities must be capable of responding to more than one call at a time; 
thus more than one dispatching radio communicates with more than one remote 
vehicle. Cities face the problem of signals reflected from buildings and 
these effects lead to the provision of even more redundancy in the system 
for communicating with vehicles. (One city employs an electronic logic 
system which samples a number of radio paths and then selects the one with 
the best signal quality). Within a police car or fire truck, "harsh" describes 
the normal environment for an electronic unit in terms of heat, vibration, 
moisture and corrosive road dirt. The packaging of electronics necessary 
for successful operation in road vehicles also makes them invulnerable to 
graphite fibers. 
The recent fire in a New York City Central Telephone Exchange raised the con- 
cern for a failure incident which cou,ld block the operation of a telephone 
switching center. Surveys have shown that the older stations are more open 
while the newer electronic systems need the advantages of a closed recircu- 
lating air conditioning system. All new construction will have controlled 
ventilation. It appears that fibers could get into the older stations and 
potentially interrupt a switching function. On the other hand, telephone 
stations represent numbers of identical installations each performing the 
same task. Single fibers could cause wrong numbers or stalled switching in 
one or more individual elements, but not upset the entire exchange at one 
time. 
. 
The history of blackouts in the Northeast leads to a concern for the circuitry 
which controls power generation stations, in particular fossil fueled plants. 
Such installations live with fly ash, and in addition, coal fired plants live 
with coal dust. Practical considerations led to isolated control rooms with 
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the electrical portions of control circuits contained within the control rooms. 
The isolation afforded by the control rooms in older stations may admit some 
airborne fibers. Such stations use voltages in the range 125-200 volts in 
their control elements; single fibers are not considered capable of precipi- 
tating a damaging failure at such voltages. The newer installations employ 
digital computers as active elements in the control systems. The correspond- 
ing ventilation systems employ more than one stage of air filtration with the 
second stage specified as a high efficiency dust remover. Such systems effec- 
tively isolate the control room from the rest of the generation station. 
The financial community and a segment of the manufacturing community depend 
upon data and records stored in computers. A failure which compromises such 
records represents a major impact. The term "computer room" as an environ- 
mentally controlled area reflects the history of usage for electronic comput- 
ers. Practical considerations of heat generation and access for cabling 
lead to installations with dropped ceilings, raised floors and a separate 
air conditioning system employing filters for dust and lint control. The 
computer electronics generate heat, the printers can be noisy and tape readers 
are sensitive to airborne dirt and dust. The trend toward smaller computers 
has not changed the manner of installation or the needs for protection. 
Computer manufacturers currently specify a minimum value for the dust removal 
efficiency of the air conditioning filters, and at these minimum values 
filters are effective barriers to airborne fibers. While airborne fibers 
may enter areas containing items such as point-of-sale cash registers or local 
terminals the main-frame installations appear environmentally isolated. 
"Continuous process" describes the manufacture of such items as paper, textile 
fibers, industrial chemicals, petroleum refining, etc. For such an instal- 
lation the loss of control at one location could stop the entire operation, 
and a restart could be costly. Control for such operations depends upon 
systems built up of specialized elements and displays with the control stations 
often standing alongside the operating line. The local environment can be 
benign, just wet, corrosive, or even explosive. A long roster of American 
companies manufacture control related equipment; most represent specialty 
items with but a few firms providing the major portions of the integrated 
control systems used in the continuous process industries. A canvass of the 
principal manufacturers of control system elements revealed that each recog- 
nized the potential applications of his equipment and designed accordingly. 
One assumed every unit would see service in the extremely corrosive environ- 
ment of a pulp mill. All circuit boards received a conformal coating. A 
second manufacturer utilized tightly sealed cases. A third used a mix of 
both depending upon the installation. The installation of electrical cir- 
cuitry into industrial buildings utilizes standardized classes of enclosures 
as defined by the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA). The 
classes range from General Purpose Indoor (NEMA Class 1) as the most open and 
continues through degrees of sealing for rain, dust, immersion and explosive 
atmospheres. NEMA Class #12 appears as the industrial standard for an in- 
stallation which needs protection from both moisture and dust. The nature of a 
continuous process operation seems to preclude any exposure of electrical 
circuit elements to the ambient environment. 
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"Automated production" can be envisioned as those operations which machine 
metal, fill bottles, seal cans or wrap packages. A number of closely con- 
trolled steps proceed in sequence. The disruption of one step halts all the 
others, and an unscheduled halt could result in a damaged product. The en- 
vironment in such lines can range from benign (as in some food processing 
lines) up through cutting fluid sprays to explosive as in a line which filled 
aerosol cans with a hydrocarbon propellant. Automated machining lines employ 
numerically controlled machine tools and some employ dedicated computers. 
Equipment operating in such environments finds the need to place high effi- 
ciency filters in the ventilated cases or to completely seal the cases. Re- 
views of maintenance records for machining lines show that sealed units have 
minimum calls. The records also show that when the environment includes metal 
chips,, a damaged seal usually results in an electrical failure caused by the 
ingestion of conductive debris. For such installations the measures which 
seal out the ambient contaminants also seal out airborne graphite fibers. 
Assembly line operations involve products which range from automobiles to 
washing machines. Failure at any step in an assembly line could halt the 
entire line and idle the work force. Where electrical items play critical 
roles in the process, the surveys have found either sealed cases, multiple 
units or ready spares. For some assembly lines such as televisions, or home 
appliances, a degree of cleanliness becomes a requirement. Cleanliness tends 
to limit the potential for a line halt caused by graphite fibers. In summary, 
assembly lines require continuous monitor for potential stoppages or bottle- 
necks. Problems receive prompt attention. Operations in unprotected environ- 
ments such as the assembly of automobiles requires ready spares or redundant 
installations; other assembly lines have the protection afforded by air- 
conditioning. As a result assembly line operations do not appear vulnerable 
to stoppage by airborne graphite fibers. 
The results from surveys can be summarized in terms of events which will not 
happen. Figure 5 lists the principal findings for services, for utilities 
and for commercial institutions. Life-critical functions appear to have the 
necessary degree of environmental isolation to preclude a threat to life. The 
police, fire and rescue communication links will function. Generating sta- 
tions do not appear vulnerable. For telephones one could get a wrong number 
or not complete a call on the first try, but that happens even now. The 
banks, the brokerage houses and similar operations appear to have adequate 
protections. 
Figure 5 summarizes the results from surveying manufacturing installations, 
and these show a range in potential for impact. The potential for impact 
may be addressed in terms of industry types as defined by the two digit 
SIC code. Eight of the SIC classes for manufacturing industry operate under 
environmental conditions which result in an effective isolation of electrical 
iterns from the ambient environment. The Food Processing Industry, SIC 20, 
lives with a cleanliness requirement. In these industries operations must 
proceed in environmentally controlled areas. As examples,in a frozen food 
plant, equipment has to proceed in refrigerated areas, meat packing equipment 
has to permit wash down, etc. 
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The printing plants, SIC 27, must control humidity just to keep paper moving 
through their presses. Their sensitive electrical equipment becomes environ- 
mentally isolated. The other 6 classes represent the continuous process 
industries working in corrosive environments. The two classes of manufacturing 
which machine metal and thereby must contend with conductive debris include 
the fabrication of machinery and the fabrication portion of the automobile, 
airplane, and railroad equipment industries. These two together with the 
first eight show value-of-shipments totalling 55 percent of all manufacturing 
as compiled by the last Census of Manufacturers. 
The manufacturer of electronic and electrical circuitry items requires a 
degree of cleanliness for control of contaminants and debris. These factories 
take advantage of air conditioning or air filtration as a measure of control, 
The air conditioning reduces the probability for entry of fibers and thereby 
reduces the economic impact for another 10 percent of industrial installation. 
Where assembly lines and fabrication lines operate with ready spares such as 
observed in the controllers for spot welding of auto bodies, the potential 
for economic impact is also reduced. Another 7 percent of American industry 
carries this type of protection. 
The total experience from surveying a cross section of the workplaces in the 
United States leads to a series of conclusions relative to the degree of 
economic impact which can result from the entry of airborne graphite fiber 
into a workplace. Figure 6 lists these conclusions. The life critical areas 
may be excluded from any impact considerations. Emergency services, utilities 
and commercial institutions could suffer non-disruptive failures. For the 
manufacturing industries half the total value-of-shipments comes from factories 
which may be eliminated from impact projections. The surveys did not see any 
failure sites within factories where airborne fibers could cause a total 
factory shutdown. For manufacturing, impact will be in terms of single 
machines. The losses will be costs for troubleshooting and repair with some 
operators temporarily idled and some product damage or production loss. 
The surveys found that manufacturing operations must contend with a number of 
randomly occurring failures in items of electrical equipment. The potential 
number of additional failures caused by fibers would not be recognized against 
the background of the present random failures. In a discussion after a tour, 
one plant engineer summarized the potential impact in the words, "We probably 
would not even know if it had happened." 
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I - 
THE SURVEYS OF PUBLIC, UTILITY, COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL 
INSTALLATIONS PROVIDED THREE ELEMENTS OF DATA: 
l ECONOMIC MODELLING: DATA TO ESTIMATE THE IMPACT OF 
A FIBER INDUCED FAILURE AS COSTS OF REPAIR, REPLACE, 
LOST TIME, ETC, 
o HAZARD SENSITIVITY: DATA TO IDENTIFY WAYS FIBERS 
COULD INTERFERE WITH LIFE CRITICAL OR EMERGENCY 
SERVICES, 
o OPERATION SENSITIVITY: DATA TO DEFINE THE EFFECTS OF 
AN IN-PLACE PROTECTION OR HIGHLIGHT A PARTICULAR SEN- 
SITIVITY TO AIRBORNE FIBERS, 
Figure 1.- Survey of facilities for potential effects 
from airborne graphite fiber. 
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1) PUBLIC SUPPORT JKJ, 3) COMMERCIAL INSTALLATIONS NO, 
HOSPITALS 7 DEPARTMENT S ORES 2 
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLS 6 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 2 
AIRPORTS-AIRLINES 3 RADIO AND TV STATIONS 6 
POLICE HEADQUARTERS 2 ANALYTICAL LABORATORIES 1 
FIRE DISPATCH 2 
POST OFFICES 
4) MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS (SIC> 
1 
TRAFFIC CONTROL 1 MEAT PACKING (20) 1 
TEXTILE MILL (22) 1 
21 UTILITIES GARMENTS (23) 1 
TELEPHONE XCHANGES 3 PULP AND PAPER (26) 1 
POWER GENERATOR, DISTRIB, 3 PUBLISHING (271 2 
REFUSE INCINERATORS 2 TEXTILE FIBERS (28) 1 
AMTRAK 1 TOILETRIES 
STEEL MILLS 
WIRE, CABLE 
ELECTRICAL EQUIP, 
AUTOMOTIVE FAB/ASSY 
(28) 1 
(33) 2 
(33) 1 
(361 6 
(37) 4 
Figure 2.- Summary of facilities surveyed. 
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o ON-SITE TECHNICAL SURVEYS COVERED 62 LOCATIONS 
AS PUBLIC, UTILITY, COMMERCIAL AND MANUFACTURING FACILITIES 
o PRESENT OPERATING REQUIREMENTS RESULT IN FACILITY CON- 
FIGURATIONS OR FEATURES WHICH PROTECT AGAINST FIBER ENTRY 
OR INTERACTIONS, 
-AIR CONDITIONED BUILDINGS WITH FILTERS FOR INTAKES AND 
RECIRCULATION, 
-SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT IN SEPARATE ROOMS WITH INDEPENDENT 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, 
-SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT IN CLOSED OR FILTERED VENTILATION CABINETS, 
-ELECTRONIC CIRCUIT BOARDS WITH CONFORMAL COATINGS, 
-FAILURE PRONE EQUIPMENT BACKED BY READY SPARES, 
Figure 3.- Surveys of facilities, general findings. 
145 
AREA OF CONCERN 
1, HOSPITAL OPERATING ROOMS 
AND CRITICAL CARE AREAS 
2, HOSPITAL ROOMS 
3, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 
TOWERS AND EQUIPMENT 
4, POLICE/FIRE EMERGENCY 
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 
5, TELEPHONE XCHANGE 
CENTERS 
6, POWER GENERATION CONTROL 
SYSTEMS 
7, DATA STORED IN CENTRAL 
COMPUTERS 
8, CONTINUOUS PROCESS CONTROL 
SYSTEMS 
9, AUTOMATED PRODUCTION CONTROL 
SYSTEMS / 
10, ASSEMBLY LINE OPERATING 
AND CONTROL ELEMENTS 
PRESENT OPERATING CONCERN .~ .~_._ ..~ 
AIRBORNE INFECTIONS 
' CONTAMINANTS 
e LINT 
OPERATING TEMPERATURE 
: ELECTROMAGNETIC NTERFERENCE 
RF SIGNAL QUALITY 
: IN-VEHICLE OPERATION 
AIRBORNE PARTICULATES 
: NEED FOR MULTIPLE INSTALLATION 
FUEL DUST 
: FLY ASH 
HEAT GENERATION - HUMIDITY 
: AIRBORNE CONTAMINANTS 
CORROSIVE FLUIDS AND 
: EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERES 
SPRAYS 
CUTTING FLUID SPRAY 
: EXPLOSIVE/CORROSIVE ATMOSPHERES 
EQUIPMENT BREAKDOWN 
: AIRBORNE CONTAMINANTS 
Figure 4.- Critical failure areas and present protection. 
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PRESENT PROTECTION 
"ABSOLUTE" AIR FILTRATION 
' (HILL-BURTON REQUIREMENT) 
, CLOSED CASES 
RECIRCULATING FILTERED AIR 
: RF SHIELDED CABINETS 
MULTIPLE UNITS 
: CLOSED CASES 
RECIRCULATING FILTERED AIR 
: REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT 
CONTROL ROOMS EPARATED 
' WITH RECIRCULATING FILTERED AIR 
~~~ 
ROOM-WITHIN-ROOMS 
: RECIRCULATING FILTERED AIR 
COATED CIRCUIT BOARDS 
: SEALED CASES (NEMA #12) 
HIGH EFFICIENCY FILTERS OR 
' SEALED CASES 
READY SPARES 
: RECIRCULATING FILTERED AIR 
EFFECT 
I FIBERS DO NOT ENTER AREAS 
, ITEMS NOT VULNERABLE 
FIBERS Dil NOT ENTER AREA 
: ITEMS NOT VULNERABLE 
SYSTEM ACCEPTS SINGLE FAILURES 
: ITEMS NOT VULNERABLE 
LIMITED FIBER ENTRY 
: SYSTEM ACCEPTS SINGLE FAILURES 
OLDER STATIONS: LIMITED FIBER ENTRY 
' CONTROL VOLTAGES NOT SENSITIVE TO FIBERS 
, NEW STATIONS: ENVIRONMENTALLY ISOLATED 
, FIBERS DO NOT ENTER COMPUTER AREAS 
, NO ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT ELEMENTS 
OPEN TO FIBERS 
, FIBERS DO NOT ENTER CASES 
SYSTEM ACCEPTS SINGLE FAILURES 
: LIMITED FIBER ENTRY 
Figure 4.- Concluded. 
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PERCENT OF 
. INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS 
- NO IMPACT BECAUSE OF PROTECTION FROM PRESENT OPERATION 
ENVIRONMENT: 
NATIONAL VALUE-OF- 
SHIPMENTS 
40 
SIC 20 FOOD, 22 TEXTILE MILLS, 26 PAPER, 27 PRINTING, 28 CHEMICALS, 
29 PETROLEUM AND COAL, 30 RUBBER, 31 LEATHER 
- NO IMPACT BECAUSE OPERATIONS NEED LOCAL PROTECTION 15 
FROM CUTTING FLUIDS, CONTAMINANTS: 
SIC 135 MACHINERY, 37 TRANSPORTATION (PARTIAL) 
- REDUCED IMPACT BECAUSE OPERATIONS NEED AIRCONDITIONING OR 10 
SOME CONTROL OF AMBIENT CONDITIONS: 
SIC 36 ELECTRICAL, 38 INSTRUMENTS 
- REDUCED IMPACT BECAUSE OPERATIONS ARE SUPPORTED BY READY SPARES: 7 
SIC 37 TRANSPORTATION (PARTIAL) 
SIC 33 PRIMARY METAL (PARTIAL) 
l LIFE CRITICAL FUNCTIONS HAVE IN-PLACE PROTECTIONS AGAINST 
THE ENTRY OF AIRBORNE GRAPHITE FIBERS, 
o EMERGENCY SERVICES WILL NOT BE INTERRUPTED BY AIRBORNE GRAPHITE 
FIBERS .
o ELECTRICAL UTILITIES WILL NOT BE DISRUPTED BY AIRBORNE GRAPHITE 
FIBERS, 
o TELEPHONE SYSTEMS WILL NOT BE DISABLED BY AIRBORNE GRAPHITE 
FIBERS, 
o COMMERCIAL INSTITUTIONS WILL NOT LOSE THEIR ESSENTIAL RECORDS 
STORED IN COMPUTERS, 
Figure 5.- Results from surveys. 
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o LIFE CRITICAL FUNCTIONS: EXCLUDE FROM IMPACT PROJECTIONS, 
o EMERGENCY SERVICES: ECONOMIC IMPACT LIMITED TO SINGLE ITEMS 
OF EQUIPMENT, 
o UTILITIES: ECONOMIC IMPACT IN TERMS OF A LOCAL OUTAGE/REPAIR, 
o COMMERCIAL INSTITUTIONS: IMPACT IN TERMS OF PERIPHERAL EQUIPMENT, 
o INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS: 
- FOR HALF OF INDUSTRY, NO ECONOMIC IMPACT, 
- NO FACTORY SHUTDOWNS, 
- ECONOMIC IMPACT IN TERMS OF SINGLE FAILURES AND REPAIRS, 
Figure 6.- Conclusions. 
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